St. John's Law Review
Volume 51, Summer 1977, Number 4

Article 8

Third-Party Plaintiff May Not Enforce Judgment for Contribution
Until He Has Paid More Than His Dole Share to Plaintiff
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:786

constitutionally permissible." Defendant voluntarily entered the
state expecting to form a business relationship with a New York
corporation. In addition to being present in the state on the day of
his visit, defendant negotiated and entered into an agreement creating an on-going relationship with a New York resident." Thus, since
defendant did indeed avail himself "of the privilege of conducting
activities" in New York, his motion to dismiss on due process
grounds was properly denied."o More importantly, however,
Schwartz sheds additional light on the meaning of the "transacts
any business" clause. The Court indicated that it is the nature and
quality and not merely the quantity of a nonresident's contacts with
New York that are determinative." In evaluating these contacts, the
activities of the nonresident should be viewed comprehensively and
not as isolated incidents. Under these guidelines, the conclusion
that defendant Schwartz transacted business in the state appears
justifiable. The import of this holding seems clear: "[W]hen a
defendant physically enters New York on a commercial enterprise,
he will have a most difficult time persuading the court that he was
not at least transacting business.""2
ARTICLE

14 -

CONTRIBUTION

Third-partyplaintiff may not enforce judgment for contribution
until he has paid more than his Dole share to plaintiff.
Article 14 of the CPLR, codifying the Court of Appeals' landThe Supreme Court has indicated that a defendant's single contact is sufficient to
enable a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over him. See McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, the defendant insurance company mailed a reinsurance certificate to a California resident offering to insure the latter in accordance with the
terms of the expired agreement. The record showed this to be the only contact the defendant
company had with California; nonetheless, the Court concluded that due process requirements were met. 355 U.S. at 223. The New York activities of Schwartz, see text accompanying
note 46 supra, appear to be more extensive and pervasive than the contacts found acceptable
in McGee. In fact, Dean McLaughlin has stated that the exercise of jurisdiction in Schwartz
was within the limits of the due process clause. McLaughlin, Long-Arm Jurisdiction,
N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1977, at 2, col. 1.
" 41 N.Y.2d at 653-54, 363 N.E.2d at 554-55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
" See note 58 supra.
81 Thus, in assessing the exercise of CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction, the nature and quality
of each individual defendant's activities have to be examined to determine whether he indeed
was transacting business in New York. Certain factors are deemed important by courts
making such a determination: (1) who was present in the state, (2) was he a high level official
of the corporation, (3) what was he doing in New York, (4) were there contract negotiations
in the state, and if so, of what duration? See, e.g., Moser v. Boatman, 392 F. Supp. 270, 27273 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
6 McLaughlin, Long-Arm Jurisdiction,N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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mark decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,6" provides for a right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors 4 Pursuant to CPLR 1402, a
jointly liable party may recover from other joint tortfeasors "the
excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment" obtained by the injured person. 5 Recently, in Klinger v.
Dudley,6 the Court of Appeals strictly construed this language,
holding that a joint tortfeasor may not enforce a judgment for contribution until he actually has paid an amount in excess of his Dole
share to the plaintiff. 7
Plaintiff Klinger had commenced a wrongful death action
against defendants Cookson, Dudley, and Leone. Leone filed a
cross-claim against his codefendants and impleaded four additional
parties, the Smiths and the Hammonds. Klinger never amended her
complaint to assert a cause of action directly against any of these
third-party defendants. 8 Prior to trial, defendants Dudley succeeded in having plaintiff's action against them dismissed,69 but due
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), discussed in CPLR 3019,
commentary at 231-304 (McKinney 1974); id. at 17-33 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); The
Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 148, 185 (1972); 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 815 (1972). Prior to Dole,
contribution among tortfeasors could be obtained only in limited situations. See CPLR 3019,
commentary at 233-35 (McKinney 1974).
11 Section 1401 of the CPLR provides that persons responsible for the same tort "may
obtain contribution among them[selves]." CPLR 1401.
At common law, a joint tortfeasor could not obtain contribution. W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 50, at 305-06 (4th ed. 1971). Although this common law rule originated in 1799 in
Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), it is waning rapidly today. W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971). It was abolished in New York in 1972.
See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147-51, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-94, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 386-90 (1972).
1 CPLR 1402. Contribution may be sought in a separate action, or by way of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim in the underlying action. CPLR 1403. Each joint
tortfeasor is liable for his equitable share of the judgment which is "determined in accordance
with [his] . . . relative culpability." CPLR 1402. When the claim for contribution is made
in the underlying action, the plaintiff may amend his complaint within 20 days to assert a
cause of action directly against the third-party defendant. CPLR 1009.
es 41 N.Y.2d 362, 361 N.E.2d 974, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1977), modifying 49 App. Div. 2d
693, 370 N.Y.S.2d 760 (4th Dep't 1975).
U 41 N.Y.2d at 371, 361 N.E.2d at 980, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
Although the Court did not explain why Klinger failed to amend her complaint to state
a cause of action directly against the Smiths, id. at 368, 361 N.E.2d at 978-79, 393 N.Y.S.2d
at 328, it appears that the Smiths were not recognized as potential defendants until the
statute of limitations had run. Telephone conversation with James N. Hite, Esq., attorney
for appellant Klinger (Mar. 7, 1977).
"' The Dudleys' motion for summary judgment had been granted following the entry of
a preclusion order against plaintiff due to her failure to satisfy the Dudleys' demand for bills
of particulars. Significantly, plaintiff's attorney had delayed more than 3 years in moving to
vacate the conditional preclusion order. Klinger v. Dudley, 40 App. Div. 2d 1078, 339
N.Y.S.2d 223 (4th Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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to Leone's cross-claim remained in the case as third-party defendants. The jury awarded Klinger damages of $300,000, apportioning 65% against Leone, 10% against the Smiths, and 25% against
the Dudleys. 0 Leone was able to satisfy $10,000 of the judgment
through an insurance policy, but he apparently had no other assets.
To afford plaintiff further recovery, a judgment was entered permitting defendant to collect from the Smiths and Dudleys.71 On
appeal, the fourth department held that enforcement against these
third-parties is conditioned "upon defendant Leone paying the
full amount of the judgment rendered against him.""2
The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the appellate
division, holding that recovery against the third-parties is dependent upon defendant satisfying "more than his proportionate share
of the judgment."7 In so ruling, the Court rejected Klinger's contention that a third-party defendant should not be permitted to avoid
liability merely because the main defendant is not financially responsible. Judge Cooke, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized
that the holding in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,74 codified in CPLR
1402, was not intended to safeguard the rights of the plaintiff;
rather, its purpose was to provide for the allocation of fault among
tortfeasors. 5 A plaintiff often is able to protect himself, the Court
suggested, by directly asserting a cause of action against a thirdparty defendant.76 In concluding its opinion, the Klinger Court distinguished its recent holding in Rock v. Reed-Prentice Division of
Package Machinery Co.77 There, the Court of Appeals permitted
70 41 N.Y.2d at 365, 361 N.E.2d at 976-77, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 326.

Id. at 365, 361 N.E.2d at 977, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 326.

72 49 App. Div. 2d 693, 693, 370 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (4th Dep't 1975) (mem.) (emphasis

added).
" 41 N.Y.2d at 371, 361 N.E.2d at 981, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 330. In Valentino v. Thompson,
41 N.Y.2d 362, 361 N.E.2d 974, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1977), a case consolidated with Klinger
on appeal, plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident while riding in a vehicle owned
by their employer and operated by a fellow employee. Since plaintiffs' exclusive remedy
against their employer and fellow employee was workmen's compensation benefits, see N.Y.
WORK. COMp. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977), suit was brought against only the owner
and the estate of the operator of the other vehicle involved in the collision. Plaintiffs' employer and the estate of the fellow employee, however, were impleaded by the defendants.
The jury returned a verdict of $632,000, finding the defendants 75% responsible and the thirdparty defendants' employer and fellow employee's estate 25% liable for the damages. Defendants had no assets other than insurance policies which paid only $20,000 of the judgment.
41 N.Y.2d at 366-67, 361 N.E.2d at 977-78, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27.
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
7' 41 N.Y.2d at 367-69, 361 N.E.2d at 978-79, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28.
78 Id.
" 39 N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1976), discussed in CPLR 1402,
commentary at 373-74 (McKinney 1976).
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enforcement of a judgment against a third-party defendant even
though the defendant had not paid more than his Dole share to the
plaintiff." Judge Cooke explained that in Rock, while the amount
recovered from the main defendant was not in excess of his Dole
share, it had been paid in full settlement of his obligation to the
plaintiff. 9 Once settlement in full has been made, the judge reasoned, the Rock decision allows the defendant to obtain contribution from other jointly-liable parties." Since no settlement had been
reached in Klinger, the Court concluded that Rock was inapposite.
It is submitted that the Klinger holding is both sound and
consistent with the principles underlying the concept of contribution." Nevertheless, since plaintiff is left with a meager prospect of
collecting most of his $300,000 judgment, the result seems harsh. In
seeking methods to avoid this situation in the future, the practitioner should consider the Klinger Court's explicit holding that defendant must have paid "more than his proportionate share of the
judgment"82 to plaintiff to be entitled to contribution from a thirdparty defendant. This would appear to eliminate the possibility of
a defendant obtaining contribution upon payment of an amount
equal to his Dole share.13 Therefore, plaintiffs must be careful to
39 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 346 N.E.2d at 524, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24.
41 N.Y.2d at 371, 361 N.E.2d at 980, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
"Id. Under Rock, a defendant who possesses assets in an amount insufficient to satisfy
the entire judgment is encouraged to settle with the plaintiff. By settling, defendant may
obtain contribution from his joint tortfeasors without paying in excess of his Dole share of
the entire judgment amount.
11Prior to Klinger, most authorities had concluded that a defendant may not obtain
contribution until he has paid more than his proportionate share to plaintiff. See Adams v.
Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 826-27, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974);
CPLR 1402, commentary at 372-73 (McKinney 1976); id. 3019, commentary at 278-79
(McKinney 1974); McLaughlin, Legislation-I,N.Y.L.J., June 14, 1974, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col.
3; 2A WK&M %1402.01. This rule appears to be based upon the principle that a right to
indemnification does not arise until a loss is sustained. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTION § §
76-77 (1937); cf. 2 S. WILLISTON,THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 345, at 772 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959).
Since the right to contribution under Dole amounts to partial indemnification, see W. PRosSER, THE LAW OF Toms § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971), it would seem proper to require that the
'

'9

defendant satisfy more than his proportionate share of the judgment, thereby sustaining an

actual loss, prior to receiving contribution.
In Bonwit-Teller v. Rosenstiel, 75 Misc. 2d 108, 347 N.Y.S.2d 753 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1968), however, the court allowed a defendant to enforce a judgment against a thirdparty defendant before defendant had paid anything to the plaintiff. Significantly, Rosenstiel involved a joint contractual obligation which, the court noted, "is absolute, and not
merely an indemnification against loss." 75 Misc. 2d at 110, 347 N.Y.S.2d at,755. Presumably, this language indicates that the Rosenstiel court would have reached a different result
had the case involved a Dole situation.
-2 41 N.Y.2d at 372, 361 N.E.2d at 981, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 330 (emphasis added).
8 Although in Klinger, the fourth department stated that defendant was entitled to
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locate financially responsible parties and ensure that all causes of
action are asserted directly against them. In addition, settlements
accompanied by releases of liability should only be entered into in
full knowledge of the financial strength of the remaining parties."'
The Klinger decision indicates that the Court of Appeals will require strict adherence to the statutory mechanism for obtaining
contribution. If properly used, New York procedural law provides
the means to ensure that those responsible for the injury to the
plaintiff are liable directly to him on the judgment.85
CPLR 1402: Defense of laches may be interposed in separateaction
for Dole contribution.
Actions for indemnity in New York traditionally have been analogized to claim in quasi-contract and hence governed by the 6year contract statute of limitations.8 6 With the advent of a right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, it was widely assumed that the
6-year limitation period would control these actions as well.87 Recently, however, in the case of Blum v. Good Humor Corp.,8 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, qualified this 6-year time
limitation by holding that laches may be interposed as a defense in
an action for contribution among joint tortfeasors 9
contribution "upon ... paying the full amount of the judgment rendered against him," 49
App. Div. 2d 693, 693, 370 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761, prior authority had indicated that defendant
need only pay an amount in excess of his Dole share to be eligible for contribution. See Adams
v. Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 826-27, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974);
CPLR 3019, commentary at 276-79 (McKinney 1974); 2A WK&M
1402.01. The Klinger
Court agreed with the latter interpretation. 41 N.Y.2d at 372, 361 N.E.2d at 981, 393 N.Y.S.2d
at 330. Therefore, under Klinger, a defendant who has paid only an amount equal to his
equitable share is not entitled to contribution.
"1 General Obligations Law § 15-108 provides that a release given by a plaintiff to one of
several tortfeasors does not release the other tortfeasors from liability. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). The amount that may be obtained from the unreleased tortfeasors, however, may exceed neither their Dole shares nor the amount of the
judgment as reduced by the consideration received by the plaintiff for the release. Id.; see
id., commentary at 139-40.
See note 65 supra.
A cause of action for indemnity is predicated upon a contract implied in law; the 6year contract statute of limitations, which also governs suits in quasi-contract, therefore has
been held applicable. See Moran Transp. Corp. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 126 F. Supp. 122, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Wechsler v. Bowman, 285 N.Y. 284, 294, 34 N.E.2d 322, 327 (1941); Smith
v. Smucker, 198 Misc. 944, 947-48, 100 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38-39 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1950);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Societe Coiffure, Inc., 50 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41-42 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1944).
" See Occhialino, Contribution,NINETEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 217, 230
(1974).
57 App. Div. 2d 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't 1977).
" Id. at 912, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896.

